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RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE: FACT AND FANCY
WALTER ADAMSt
WITH only a few members dissenting, the Attorney General's National Com-
mittee to Study the Antitrust Laws has condemned fair trade pricing as "an
unwarranted compromise of the basic tenets of National antitrust policy."'
Although it recommended outright repeal of the Miller-Tydings Act 2 and
tAssociate Professor of Economics, Michigan State College; member, Attorney
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws. Professor Jamcs W. Payne,
Jr. of the University of Richmond Law School has furnished considerable assistance in
legal research, but he is not responsible for the views and recommendations expressed
herein.
1. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL's NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY TnE A.Ti-
TRUST LAws 154 (Mar. 31, 1955).
2. The Miller-Tydings Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952). amended § 1
of the Sherman Act as follows:
"Section 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal: Prozidcd, that nothing
herein contained shall render illegal, contracts or agreements prescribing minimum
prices for the resale of a commodity which bears, or the label or container of which
bears, the trade-mark, brand, or name of the producer or distributor of such com-
modity and which is in free and open competition with commodities of the same
general class produced or distributed by others, when contracts or agreements of
that description are lawful as applied to intrastate transactions, under any statute,
law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State, Territory, or the District
of Columbia in which such resale is to be made, or to which the commodity is to b2
transported for such resale, and the making of such contracts or agreements shall
not be an unfair method of competition under Section 5, as amendd ard supple-
mented, of the Act entitled 'An Act to create a Federal Trade Commission, to define
its powers and duties, and for other purposes,' approved September 26, 1914:
Provided further, That the preceding proviso shall not make lawful any contract
or agreement, providing for the establishment or maintenance of minimum resale prices
on any commodity herein involved, between manufacturers, or between producers,
or between wholesalers, or between brokers, or between factors, or between retailers,
or between persons, firms, or corporations in competition with each other. Every
person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy
hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on
conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $5,000, or by imprison-
ment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of
the court."
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the McGuire Act,3 which define the status of the state fair trade acts under
the federal antitrust laws, the Committee made no such recommendation
3. 66 STAT. 631, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952), was passed as an amendment to § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act after the Supreme Court's decision in Schwegmann Bros.
v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). The act provides:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That it is the purpose of this Act to protect the
rights of States under the United States Constitution to regulate their internal affairs
and more particularly to enact statutes and laws, and to adopt policies, which
authorize contracts and agreements prescribing minimum or stipulated prices for
the resale of commodities and to extend the minimum or stipulated prices prescribed
by such contracts and agreements to persons who are not parties thereto. It is
the further purpose of this Act to permit such statutes, laws, and public policies
to apply to commodities, contracts, agreements, and activities in or affecting inter-
state or foreign commerce.
"Sec. 2. Section 5 (a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, Is
hereby amended to read as follows:
" 'Sec. 5 (a) (1) Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are hereby declared unlawful.
" '(2) Nothing contained in this Act or in any of the Antitrust Acts shall
render unlawful any contracts or agreements prescribing minimum or stipulated
prices, or requiring a vendee to enter into contracts or agreements prescribing
minimum or stipulated prices, for the resale of a commodity which bears, or
the label or container of which bears, the trade-mark, brand, or name of the pro-
ducer or distributor of such commodity and which is in free and open competition
with commodities of the same general class produced or distributed by others, when
contracts or agreements of that description are lawful as applied to intrastate
transactions under any statute, law or public policy now or hereafter in effect in
any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia in which such resale is to be made,
or to which the commodity is to be transported for such resale.
" '(3) Nothing contained in this Act or in any of the Antitrust Acts shall
render unlawful the exercise or the enforcement of any right or right of action
created by any statute, law, or public policy now or hereafter in effect in any State,
Territory, or the District of Columbia, which in substance provides that willfully
and knowingly advertising, offering for sale, or selling any commodity at less than
the price or prices prescribed in such contracts or agreements whether the person
so advertising, offering for sale, or selling is or is not a party to such a contract
or agreement, is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person
damaged thereby.
" '(4) Neither the making of contracts or agreements as described in paragraph
(2) of this subsection, nor the exercise or enforcement of any right or right of
action as described in paragraph (3) of this subsection shall constitute an unlawful
burden or restraint upon, or interference with, commerce.
" '(5) Nothing contained in paragraph (2) of this subsection shall make lawful
contracts or agreements providing for the establishment or maintenance of minimum
or stipulated resale prices on any commodity referred to in paragraph (2) of this
subsection, between manufacturers, or between producers, or between wholesalers,
or between brokers, or between factors, or between retailers, or between persons,
firms, or corporations in competition with each other.
" '(6) The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons,
partnerships, or corporations, except banks, common carriers subject to the Acts
(Vol. 64: 967
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with respect to other forms of resale price maintenance-despite the fact
that fair trade accounts for only about ten billion dollars of annual consumer
expenditures, while resale price maintenance effectuated without recourse to
fair trade accounts for an estimated thirty billion dollars.4
In a way, this latest attack on fair trade comes as no surprise. For years
it has been fashionable for such diverse groups as the Farm Bureau Federa-
tion, the National Grange, the CIO, the General Federation of Women's
Clubs, the Consumers Union, the Antitrust Division, and the Federal Trade
Commission to single out fair trade as a restraint on competition and a con-
spiracy against the public. Lawyers and economists, both in and out of the
universities, have joined in the crusade, and have assembled a formidable
case against fair trade.5 Nevertheless, in the heat of controversy, a number
of facts have been overlooked: the case against fair trade rests on highly am-
bivalent evidence; resale price maintenance can frequently be achieved with-
out recourse to fair trade; the methods for maintaining resale prices other
than fair trade have a strong legal footing; and therefore a repeal of the
Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts is not an effective way of coping with
the alleged vice of resale price maintenance.
The opponents of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts misconceive their
target. What should be urged by these critics is vigorous enforcement of the
"free and open competition" provisos of the fair trade laws.0 This is true
for two reasons: (1) If resale price maintenance is practiced in a healthy
competitive atmosphere no significant restraint on competition results, yet
at the same time, substantial protection is afforded against the evils flowing
from loss-leader selling and from the competitive advantages of large chain
distributors vis-a-vis small independents. (2) Even if Miller-Tydings and
to regulate commerce, air carriers and foreign air carriers subject to the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, and persons, partnerships, or corporations subject to the
Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921, except as provided in section 406(b) uf said
Act, from using unfair methods of competition in commerce and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in commerce.' "
4. BUREAU OF EDUcATION oN FAIR TRADE, MfmoRANDUM TO THE Aramxs:v GENE.,EAL'S
NATIONAL Commn= To STUDY THE ANTriRUST LAws 4 (1954).
5. See GunTHER, PRICE CONTROL UxvER FAIR TRADE LmisLArox (1939); .MLexo,
GOvERNMSENT A-D BusixEss 461-85 (2d ed. 1955) ; FTC, REnour oN RFs,ix Picz MAI -
TENANCE (1945) ; Bowman, Resale Price Maintenance-A Monopoly Problemn, 25 U. Cni. J.
Bus. '141 (1952); -LR. REP. No. 1516, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 18-52 (1952) ; S. r.Fx Nu.
1741, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); Hearings Before the Anttrust Subconmuittee of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
6. 'Miller-Tydings Act, supra note 2; McGuire Act, § 5 (a) (2), supra note 3. Only
one decision has been found holding that goods retailed under resale price maintenance
contracts were not in free and open competition with goods of the same general class.
Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC, 158 F2d 592 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 823
(1947). And courts have found that resale price fixing of copyrighted books does not
violate this requirement, although The Grapes of Wrath might well be thought so unique
as not to be in "free and open competition" with Ferdinand the Bull. Fulda, Resale Price
Maintenaiwe, 21 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 175, 197-93 (1954).
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McGuire were repealed, the non-conspiratorial and non-monopolistic producer
could still maintain resale prices through consignment sales or an agency
system, or by exercising his right to refuse to deal, or possibly by reliance on
the doctrine of equitable servitudes on chattels. It is the purpose of this article
to discuss briefly the arguments for and against fair trade, and then to analyze
the alternative legal bases for resale price maintenance.
THE FAIR TRADE CONTROVERSY
The most telling argument against fair trade is that in practical effect it
nullifies the antitrust prohibitions against horizontal price fixing. If, it is
argued, a manufacturer may enter into a fair trade agreement with retailer
A, and if he may stipulate the minimum price at which A can sell the product,
and if, under the nonsigner clause of the McGuire Act,7 he may impose
identical resale prices on retailers B, C, D, and E, who have notice of the
contract with A but who enter no such contract themselves, then the economic
effect is the same as if A, B, C, D, and E had entered into a horizontal price
fixing agreement directly. As the Federal Trade Commission points out:
"Nothing is more clearly established in Federal policy than the principle
that horizontal price fixing shall not be tolerated. The [McGuire Act]
pays lip service to that principle; yet its effect would be that a minimum
price fixed by contract with one retail distributor would become the mini-
mum price for all other retail distributors who were placed upon notice of the
existence of the contract. The rigidity and uniformity of the price would
be exactly that of the most rigid horizontal price-fixing conspiracy; the
level of the price would be likely to be at least as high as in a
horizontal conspiracy; and the public control of the reasonableness of
the arrangement would be as nonexistent as in the case of a horizontal
conspiracy. Thenceforward, any group of distributors desiring to fix
prices horizontally would be foolish to take the direct road to that end.
Instead some one of their number would make a vertical contract with
a supplier and then place the other members of the group on notice of
the existence of the contract. Through this means, the group could not
only negate the objections of the Government, but could actually use the
courts as devices to enforce the arrangement."
Aside from its allegedly deleterious effects on competition, fair trade is said
to be an instrument for exploiting the consumer. Fortune magazine, for ex-
ample, in its picturesque way, contrasts the consumer's plight in the fair
trade states with the consumer paradise to be found in the "oases of competi-
tive pricing":
"Congressmen and lesser residents of the District of Columbia can lather
up with a big tube of Barbasol bought for 29 cents; in fair-trade Mary-
land, the same tube would cost 39 cents. The Congressmen can regenerate
the blood cells with Lilly's Lextron Pulvules (84's) for $2.29, instead
of the fair-trade price of $3.15. A bottle of Old Granddad is $5.45 in
7. McGuire Act, § 5(a) (3),.supra note 3.
8. H.R. REP. No. 1437, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1952).
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Washington, $6.65 (before state tax) across the line. BC headache
powders are a dime instead of 19 cents." 9
This and other surveys 10 are repeatedly cited to demonstrate the prejudicial
effect of fair trade on the consuming public.
Fair trade is also charged with weakening the competitive position of the
independent retailer. Corwin Edwards, for example, suggests that fair trade
enables chains, department stores, and mail order houses to organize low-price
raids against independent retailers by marketing private brands at prices with
which the independent retailer, limited to fair trade items, cannot compete."'
This argument is somewhat paradoxical. Fair trade is condemned for destroy-
ing price competition and thus harming the consumer. At the same time, it
is attacked for stimidating price competition and weakening the independent
retailer. Thus, fair trade opponents find themselves contending that resale
price maintenance is too effective, on the one hand, and not effective enough,
on the other.
Finally, it is contended that fair trade pricing inevitably produces a non-
competitive atmosphere which fosters violations of the antitrust laws. Boy-
cotts, threats, coercion, favoritism, discrimination, and collusion are said to
be the vices that accompany fair trade "no matter how carefully the legislation
passed by Congress may be couched in terms of safeguards and protections."
12
It is pointed out that the National Association of Retail Druggists, long a
champion of fair trade, was found guilty in 1947 of restraining competition
in drugs by fixing retail and wholesale prices, and of eliminating competition
among retail druggists.' 3 By threatening to boycott products for which accept-
able prices were not established, the NARD had compelled drug manufacturers
to establish wholesale and retail prices that would allow a satisfactory margin
to retailers. 14 Other prosecutions by the Department of Justice 15 and pro-
9. The Not-So-Fair-Trade Laws, Fortune, Jan. 1949, p. 70.
10. See MmT'm, op. cit. supra note 5, at 479-0.
11. "With national brands of drug products price-controlled, the chain can collect
substantial margins upon such products while reducing the price of its own private brands
whenever it desires to use them as leaders or to make a raid upon the national brand
business enjoyed by other stores. Since these other stores are bound not to cut prices
upon the national brands which have acquired prestige through extensive advertising,
retaliation by the victims is not possible. Thus the most obvious effect of reEale [priee
maintenance upon the relations between chain and indepenlent is to deprive the independ-
ent of a price-cutting weapon still available to the chain. The complacency vith which
the chains have accepted the operation of the state laws is no doubt partially due to this
fact." Cited in H.R. REP. No. 1516, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1952).
12. Id. at 38.
13. United States v. National Ass'n of Retail Druggists, CCH TRaDE Rzr. Ru'. § 61026
(D.N.J. 1947).
14. H.R. REP. No. 1516, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1952).
15. See United States v. National Wholesale Druggists' Ass'n., 61 F. Supp. 590 (D.N.J.
1945) (upon plea of nolo contendere fines totaling $37,000 imposed); United States v.
New York State Pharmaceutical Ass'n., CCH TRADE REG. RE,. § 61031 (S.D.N.Y. 1947)
(nolo contendere, fines of $17,000) ; and the following cases cited in H.R. REP. No. 1516,
19551
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
ceedings by the Federal Trade Commission 16 are cited as evidence that the
fair trade laws serve as a cloak for price fixing and similar restraints of trade.
In rebuttal, the fair trade advocates point out that neither the state fair trade
statutes nor the federal enabling legislation have protected competing manu-
facturers, wholesalers, or retailers against antitrust prosecution when they
were found to have engaged in any organized, conspiratorial or coercive activity
to obtain or enforce a fair trade agreement. Thus, even with fair trade, the
public is assured that competing manufacturers, wholesalers or retailers can-
not conspire to restrain trade without risking exposure to antitrust prosecution.
The very cases cited by opponents of fair trade demonstrate that the antitrust
laws can still be enforced where the practitioners of fair trade exceed or abuse
their carefully defined statutory rights.
Secondly, it is argued that the Miller-Tydings Act and the McGuire Act
permit fair trade pricing only where the goods covered thereby are in free
and open competition with goods of the same general class.1 7 From the
consumer's point of view this is a crucial safeguard against exploitation. So
long as there is effective competition between manufacturers, the fact that
each of them sees fit to fix minimum resale prices is of secondary importance.
Louis D. Brandeis pointed out:
"The position of the independent producer who establishes the price
at which his own trade-marked article shall be sold to the consumer must
not be confused with that of a combination or trust which, controlling the
market, fixes the price of a staple article. The independent producer is
engaged in a business open to competition. He establishes his price at
his peril-the peril that, if he sets it too high, either the consumer will
not buy, or, if the article is nevertheless popular, the high profits will
invite even more competition. The consumer who pays the price established
by an independent producer in a competitive line of business does so
voluntarily; he pays the price asked, because he deems the article worth
that price as compared with the cost of other competing articles. But
when a trust fixes, through its monopoly power, the price of a staple
article in common use, the consumer does not pay the price voluntarily.
He pays under compulsion."' 8
If, as the fair trade advocates claim, the consumer can chose from 58 brands
of sterling silverware, 56 brands of face powder, 76 brands of toilet soap, 31
makes of washing machines, 21 brands of floor wax; if the consumer can chose
from 93 brands of dentifrite, ranging in price from 4 to 28 cents per ounce,",
the fact that the resale price of each brand is set by the manufacturer is of
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1952) : United States v. Tri-State Retail Record Dealers' Ass'n;
United States v. Sunbeam Corp.; United States v. Allegheny County Retail Druggist'
Ass'n, 12 F.R.D. 249 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
16. See cases cited in H.R. REP. No. 1516, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1952).
17. See note 6 supra.
18. Brandeis, Competition That Kills, Harper's Weekly, Nov. 15, 1913, p. 10, re-
printed in BRANDEIS, BusINEss-A PROFESSION 256-57 (1933).
19. BUREAU OF EDUCATION ON FAIR TRADE, MEMORANDUM TO THE ArronNuc GIN-
ERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTRUST LAWS 5 (1954).
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relatively minor significance. In the context of economic reality it would
seem wiser to expend the meager antitrust appropriations combating hori-
zontal price fixing at the manufacturing level than to squander them in attack-
ing petty vertical restraints.
Thirdly, it is contended by fair trade advocates that the fair trade laws
protect the consumer, the independent retailer and the manufacturer from
loss-leader merchandising by chain and department stores. In the absence of
fair trade, a department store or chain selling a diversified product line can cut
prices on nationally advertised, trade-marked articles to build up store traffic,
and hope to make up for its low margin or losses on these items by the sale
of other, less attractively priced goods. Any survey, therefore, that contrasts
the price of selected items in selected stores at selected times in the fair trade
states with the price of the same items in non-fair trade states has little sta-
tistical significance.20 Such surveys prove only that loss-leader selling exists.
They do not indicate the volume of high-margin merchandise sold in the
selected stores. They do not reveal each store's over-all margin for any given
year. They do not necessarily reflect the over-all price level in comparable
stores in the fair trade and non-fair trade areas. They do not show to what
extent the "bargains" purchased by some consumers are subsidized by the
"lemons" purchased by other consumers. These "pick-and-choose" surveys,
according to the Bureau of Education on Fair Trade, "do not prove that
consumers in the non-fair trade areas save a single penny on their yearly
shopping bills, nor that any store in the United States charges a penny less,
on over-all inventory, where resale price maintenance does not exist."2 1 In
fact, the Bureau claims that studies made for it by A. C. Nielsen & Company
indicate that on the average the public paid less for a list of leading drug and
toilet articles in the fair trade areas than in the non-fair trade areas of the
country.22 To the extent that fair trade curbs loss-leader selling, it tends-
according to its supporters-to protect the independent retailer from "unfair,"
"cut-throat" and "predatory" competition. Such competition has been, as
Brandeis observed,
"the most potent weapon of monopoly-a means of killing the small rival
to which the great trusts have resorted most frequently. It is so simple,
so effective. Far-seeing organized capital secures by this means the co-
operation of the short-sighted unorganized consumer to his own undoing.
20. E.g., "A recent study of 117 branded drug items showed that thirty-five cost
about a third less in Washington than in Maryland, thirty-eight about a quarter less, and
twenty-nine about a seventh less. A comparison of free-trade Missouri and fair-trade
Illinois turns up much the same story. The St. Louis Star-Times figured out that
fifty-four fair-trade drug items cost an average of 162 per cent more on the east bank
of the 'Mississippi than on the St. Louis side." The Not-So-Fair-Tradc Laws, Fortune,
Jan. 1949, p. 70.
21. BuREAU OF EDucATimN ox FAiR TRADF, Mr oasC. ouM To THE A7ro:UMV Gm-
E 's N.A.T oNAL Coxmm-E To STUDY THE A=NTRusT LAws 7 (1954).
22. Ibid.
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Thoughtless or weak, he yields to the temptation of trifling immediate
gain, and, selling his birthright for a mess of pottage, becomes himself
an instrument of monopoly.
23
And by curbing loss-leader selling fair trade also protects the manufacturer's
property right in his brand name or trade-mark:
"Laws prohibiting larceny protect the manufacturer against the theft
of his physical property. Fair-trade laws protect the manufacturer against
the theft of perhaps his most valuable asset-though intangible-his good
will1."2
For these reasons the fair trade advocates maintain that the independent
retailer is protected against the sharpshooting tactics of his chain and depart-
ment store competitors, the consumer against eventual monopolization of the
distribution trade, and the manufacturer against an improper use of his
brand name or trade-mark.
Finally, the fair trade proponents point out that regardless of its intrinsic
merits, fair trade is not the only, nor even the most common technique for
effectuating resale price maintenance. Forward vertical integration, which
enables the manufacturer to sell directly to the consumer through his own
retail outlets, his own door-to-door sales organization, or his own mail order
system, gives the manufacturer the unchallenged legal right to fix resale
prices. As an alternative, the manufacturer can market his product through
an agency system or on consignment, thus retaining title to his goods until sold to
the ultimate consumer. Or the manufacturer can refuse to deal with whole-
salers or retailers who do not follow his suggested retail prices. Or-and this
has never been fully tested in the courts-he might rely on the doctrine of
equitable servitudes on chattels as a justification for resale price maintenance.
Whichever technique the manufacturer employs, the economic effect of resale
price maintenance is the same. If the principle of resale price maintenance is
objectionable on economic grounds, it is objectionable regardless of the legal
means used to effectuate it. If, therefore, fair trade is to be condemned because
of its special status under the antitrust laws, doctrinal consistency requires
that we condemn every other legal sanction for resale price maintenance.
Similarly, if fair trade is to be approved as a matter of economic policy because
of the "free and open competition" safeguard, we should explicitly impose an
identical safeguard in dealing with the alternative legal devices for attaining
resale price maintenance. The fact is that the economic consequences of resale
price maintenance are not undesirable in all circumstances: they are beneficial
to consumer, independent retailer and manufacturer alike so long as the latter
is subject to effective price competition.
The time has come then to develop the outlines of the alternatives to fair
trade. We begin with the most dubious of them.
23. BRANDEIS, BUSINESs-A PRoFESsIoN 261 (1933).
24. H.R. REP. No. 1516, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1952).
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TiiE THEORY OF EQUITABLE SERVITUDES
The theory of equitable servitudes, whose main roots go back to the de-
cision in Tulk v. Moxhay,25 has been applied almost exclusively to real estate
transactions. Under this doctrine a court of equity will, at the instance of a
covenantee or his transferee, enforce against the covenantor or his transferee
with notice a covenant restricting the use of a servient estate for the benefit
of a dominant estate.206 Varying prerequisites for enforceability qualify this
generalization. Some, but not all, courts require the existence of a dominant
estate to benefit from the covenant.27 Some, but not all, courts require that
the covenant be evidenced by a written memorandum, to satisfy the statute of
frauds28 Some, but not all, courts require that the covenant be "negative"
and not "affirmative" in its impact, i.e., that it restrict the activities of the
covenantor but not require affirmative action of him.- Some, but not all,
courts impose the ambiguous requirement that the covenant "touch and con-
cern the land."30
A particular court's attitude toward these requirements will depend on its
view of the theoretical nature of a servitude. Traditionally it is maintained
that a covenant amounting to an equitable servitude creates in the ownMer of
the dominant estate an enforceable property right in the servient estate.3 1 But
it has been argued with vigor that the true theoretical basis for the doctrine
is the principle of Lumley v. Gyc:32 the covenantee, and his transferees as
third party beneficiaries, possess an in personam contract right against the
covenantor and an in rem right against his transferees with notice, who labor
under an equitable duty of noninterference with the rights flowing from the
covenant.33
The possibility of applying the doctrine of equitable servitudes to the re-
strictive sale of chattels has been discussed in Professor Zechariah Chafee's
25. 2 Ph. 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848).
26. CLARK, PRICIP.S OF EQulTr § 94 (1948).
27. London County Council v. Allen, [1914] 3 K.B. 642 (C.A.). Contra, VanSant
v. Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 103 N.E. 194 (1913) ; Huber v. Guglielmi, 29 Ohio App. 290, 163 N.E.
571 (1928) (semble).
28. See Reno, The Enforcenent of Equitable Servitudes in Land: Part II, 23 V. L
REv. 1067, 1090-1095 (1942).
29. See Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Industrial Say. Bank, 278
N.Y. 248, 256, 15 N.E.2d 793, 795-96 (1938).
30. Neponsit Property Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Industrial Say. Bank, 278 N.Y. 248,
15 N.E2d 793 (1938); Norcross v. James, 140 Mass. 188, 2 N.E. 946 1885). Contra,
Hodge v. Sloan, 107 N.Y. 244, 17 N.E. 335 (1887). But Cf. Tulk v. Moxhay, 2 Ph. 774,
41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848).
31. See Meagher v. Appalachian Power Co., 195 Va. 138, 77 S.E2d 461 (1953);
Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 COLUin. L RnvM. 269 (1917);
Wade, Restrictions on User, 44 L.Q. REv. 51 (1928). Contra, Stone, The Equitable
Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a Contract, 18 CoLum. L. RE%,. 291 (1918), 19
CoLum. L. REv. 177 (1919); Stone, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestid Que Trust,
17 CoLum. L. REv. 467 (1917).
32. 2 E. & B. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 1033 (Q.B. 1854).
33. See Chafee, Equitable Serzitudes on Chattels, 41 HARv. L. Rev. 945, 969-77 (1928).
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monumental article, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels. 4 Professor Chafee con-
cludes that there is no theoretical difficulty inherent in the doctrine itself that
would of necessity prevent its application to a contract between a manufacturer
and a distributor obligating the latter to market the former's products at stipu-
lated prices.35 Such an application would, of course, convert the contract
into a restriction on the disposition of the chattel, so that a sale in disregard
of the contract by a person acquiring the chattel with notice of the terms of
the covenant could be enjoined. Such a sale would also subject the distributor
to liability in an action at law for damages.80
Whether or not this doctrine can be extended to the disposition of chattels
so as to effectuate a resale price agreement is less a question of theoretical
feasibility than a matter of public policy. Yet the Supreme Court in Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.37 declared resale price maintenance
contracts between manufacturer and distributor unlawful, but did not even
approach an adequate consideration of the economic factors involved, except
in a dissenting opinion by Justice Holmes. Moreover, the decision failed to
consider the possible justifications for resale price maintenance contracts under
the doctrine of Tulk v. Moxhay, since this suggestion was not made to the
Court. The Court touched on the equitable servitude only in its quotation
from Coke on Littleton:
"If a man be possessed . . of a horse or of any other chattel, real
or personal, and give or sell his whole interest or property therein, upon
condition that the donee or vendee shall not alien the same, the same is
void, because the whole interest and property is out of him, so as he
hath no possibility of a reverter; and it is against trade and traffic and
bargaining and contracting between man and man." 8
The same language, which had also been quoted in the lower court opinion,
evoked the following comment by Professor Chafee:
"The very passage from Coke on which the two judges relied is pre-
ceded by an equally strong condemnation of similar conditions for
the reverter of real estate. Coke says nothing to indicate that land may
34. 41 HARv. L. REv. 945, 969-977 (1928).
35. Id. at 968-69. Professor Chafee suggests that the question is one that must be
resolved on considerations of policy. He summarizes:
"At the close of my inquiry it must be admitted that I am much less convinced of
the desirability of equitable servitudes on chattels than when I began .... Yet the
complexities and variety of modern business may eventually present opportunities
for restrictions on personalty which are free from the disadvantages of restraint
of trade, and when that time comes the appropriate equitable machinery is ready
for use. Servitudes on chattels still seem possible and reasonable, although my
long investigation has not disclosed a single square decision establishing such a
conception in a court of last resort."
Id. at 1013.
36. CLARK, REAL COVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RuN WITH LAND" 172,
176 (2d ed. 1947).
37. 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
38. Id. at 404.
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be restricted and chattels may not, or that there is any distinction for this
purpose betveen them. He died two centuries before Tulk v. Moxhay,
which has fettered land far more than he ... would have permitted ....
The truth is that Coke was talking about conditions which totally restrain
alienation by enabling the seller to recover the sold property, while we
are concerned with provisions which merely give the seller some measure
of equitable control over its disposition in the hands of later owners,
who never cease to retain the property."
30
The Supreme Court has recently refused to review several state court de-
cisions sustaining the constitutionality of the nonsigner provisions of the New
Jersey and New York Fair Trade Acts and the McGuire Act on reasoning
which would also support application of the doctrine of equitable servitudes
to resale price maintenance. 40 It was contended that the state nonsigner pro-
visions violate the commerce clause and the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment and constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. The
McGuire Act was alleged to violate the commerce clause in authorizing the
states to enforce resale price maintenance of goods distributed in interstate
commerce. The New York and New Jersey state courts rejected these argu-
ments, and the action of the United States Supreme Court has in effect su-
stained these decisions. All of these decisions placed reliance on the decision
of the Supreme Court in Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Scagram-Distillcrs
Corp.,41 which upheld the constitutionality of the nonsigner provisions of the
Illinois Fair Trade Act. The Court there stated that fair trade was an appro-
priate means to the legitimate end of protecting the manufacturer's property
right in the good will represented by his trade-mark, and that purchasers who
had notice of the price restriction in effect assented to the protection of the
manufacturer's property right. The nonsigner provisions of state and federal
fair trade acts were thus said to impose what amounts to an equitable duty
of noninterference with property or contractual rights that is at least analogous
to the duty of noninterference entailed in an equitable servitude. The interfer-
ence with contractual rights that would result from the sale of the manu-
facturer's product by a nonsigner below the price stipulated by the manu-
facturer would, of course, be the economic pressure on the signing retailer
to reduce his price in violation of his contract with the manufacturer.
Strictly speaking, the duty created by the fair trade laws is probably
broader than the duty of noninterference that would result from an orthodox
application of the equitable servitude doctrine. The latter doctrine would
impose an equitable restriction on the disposition of chattels sold by a distribu-
tor who had covenanted with the manufacturer to maintain resale prices, and it
would impose- a duty on third persons to refrain from interfering with this
39. Chafee, supra note 33, at 982-83.
40. Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. v. Lionel Corp., 15 N.J. 191, 104 A.2d 3.04,
appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 859 (1954) ; Goody v. Raxor Corp., S. Klein on the Square, Inc.
v. Lionel Corp., 307 N.Y. 229, 120 N.E.2d 802, appeal dismissed, 348 U.S. 863 (1954).
41. 299 U.S. 183 (1936).
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contract by selling goods distributed under the contract at less than the estab-
lished price. But the duty would not seem to extend to articles that a retailer
obtained from a distributor not a party to a price maintenance contract with
the manufacturer. The retailer's pursuit of his economic self-interest in pricing
these goods would not seem to amount to actionable interference with a resale
price agreement between the manufacturer and some other distributor selling
the same kind of articles. On the other hand, under the fair trade statutes
a distributor can be enjoined from selling below the resale price stipulated
in an agreement between the manufacturer and some other distributor in the
same state if he has notice of such agreement, even though his goods were
acquired through channels not covered by a similar contract. 2 It must be
emphasized, however, that the usual situation covered by the nonsigner pro-
visions of the state and federal statutes would also be covered by the doctrine
of equitable servitudes. Thus, under the servitude doctrine a resale price
maintenance agreement between a manufacturer and a wholesaler would be
binding on a retailer who purchased from the wholesaler with notice of the
restriction, and the retailer could be enjoined from selling below the price
stipulated in the agreement. This was the situation in the Old Dearborn case.
The equity doctrine, then, although probably not yet available as a device
for maintaining resale prices, is valuable in pointing to considerations of
sound economic policy and legal principle in favor of the crucial nonsigner
clause in the McGuire Act.
43
THE REFUSAL TO DEAL
Faced with the Dr. Miles holding that contracts for the maintenance of resale
prices are forbidden by the Sherman Act, the manufacturer still may turn to
his right to select his customers as a means of accomplishing resale price main-
tenance. This right was given definitive statement by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Colgate & Co.44 In that case the indictment charged the de-
fendant with unlawfully engaging in a combination with wholesale and retail
dealers for the purpose of procuring the dealers' adherence to resale prices
fixed by the defendant. The combination was effectuated by:
"Distribution among dealers of letters, telegrams, circulars and lists show-
ing uniform prices to be charged; urging them to adhere to such prices
and notices, stating that no sales would be made to those who did not;
requests, often complied with, for information concerning dealers who
had departed from specified prices; investigation and discovery of those
not adhering thereto and placing their names upon 'suspended lists';
requests to offending dealers for assurances and promises of future ad-
herence to prices, which were often given; uniform refusals to sell to
42. McGuire Act, § 5 (a) (3) (nonsigner clause), supra note 3.
43. This clause would seem to be vitally important to the policy behind the fair trade
laws. The distributors willing to engage in predatory price cutting would be those who
would refuse to sign resale price maintenance contracts. Fulda, Resale Price Maitenance,
21 U. Cil. L. REv. 175-76 (1954).
44. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
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any who failed to give the same; sales to those who did; similar assur-
ances and promises required of, and given by, other dealers Tollowed by
sales to them; unrestricted sales to dealers with established accounts who
had observed specified prices, etc." 40
The trial court quashed the indictment, reasoning that there was no allegation
of any contract or agreement whereby the parties bound themselves to main-
tain stipulated prices "further than is involved in the circumstances that the
manufacturer, the defendant here, refused to sell to persons who would not
resell at indicated prices, and that certain retailers made purchases on this
condition, whereas, inferentially, others declined so to do."40 The lower court
further stated that the retailer, having bought from the manufacturer, was free
to price the goods on resale as he saw fit, subject only to incurring the dis-
pleasure of the manufacturer. 47 The Supreme Court accepted the district
court's interpretation of the indictment, and held that so construed, it charged
no violation of the Sherman Act:
"In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the
act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own inde-
pendent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal; and, of course, he
may announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse
to sell."48
The Colgate doctrine was limited in two subsequent Supreme Court de-
cisions. In United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc.,40 a manufacturer was charged
with selling goods under agreements that bound the vendees to comply with
resale prices fixed by the vendor. The practice was held to be a violation of the
Sherman Act. Referring to the Colgate case, the Court stated:
"The court below misapprehended the meaning and effect of the opinion
and judgment in that cause. We had no intention to overrule or modify
the doctrine of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., where the effort
was to destroy the dealer's independent discretion through restrictive
agreements. Under the interpretation adopted by the trial court and
necessarily accepted by us, the indictment failed to charge that Colgate
& Co. made agreements, either express or implied, which undertook to
obligate vendees to observe specified resale prices; and it was treated
'as alleging only recognition of the manufacturer's undoubted right to
specify resale prices and refuse to deal with anyone who failed to main-
tain the same.' "5o
And in Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co.r1 the Court again considered
its decisions in Colgate and Schrader, stating: "Apparently the former case
45. Id. at 303.
46. Id. at 305.
47. Id. at 305-06.
48. Id. at 307.
49. 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
50. Id. at 99.
51. 256 U.S. 208 (1921).
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was misapprehended. The latter opinion distinctly stated that the essential
agreement, combination or conspiracy might be implied from a course of
dealing or other circumstances.
'52
It requires Herculean efforts to square these pronouncements of the Supreme
Court, and the Dr. Miles decision, with the right to select customers, recog-
nized by Colgate and carefully preserved in subsequent decisions. The
Colgate case means at the very least that the manufacturer can establish resale
prices; that he can sell to his dealer with the understanding that future sales
are contingent upon the dealer's maintaining such prices; that the dealer can
purchase the goods manifesting his intention to abide by the condition; and
that the manufacturer can stop selling to a dealer who fails to maintain prices,
or refuse to sell to a dealer who manifests his intention to disregard the
condition. If the manufacturer makes the maintenance of resale prices a con-
dition of future sales, and the dealer in purchasing from him consents to
that condition, it would seem that an agreement to maintain the stipulated
price has been entered into by the two parties ;53 such an agreement would not,
however, amount to a contract contemplating judicial enforcement, nor would
it, under Dr. Miles, be judicially enforceable.
Mr. Charles Wesley Dunn has found a "clear" legal distinction drawn be-
tween Dr. Miles and Colgate in the Schrader decision:
"The Colgate plan presents the simple exercise of the right of freedom
of alienation of movables owned, whereas the Miles plan involves a re-
straint by contract upon that right. The Colgate plan amounts to but the
assertion of the right of ownership before sale, whereas the Miles plan is
an attempt to sell moveables and yet by contract to keep them under a
restriction hostile to the title conveyed and the right of freedom of aliena-
tion incident to it....
"But it cannot be denied that, from a practical standpoint, the two
plans are precisely the same in purpose, economic consequence and effect
upon the buying public, [and] are distinguished in method alone ...
Hence the reality of the situation is that the Colgate case essentially
legalizes what the Miles case outlaws."
4
In Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co." the Supreme
Court further limited but still preserved the Colgate doctrine. Beech-Nut
marketed its products principally through grocery, drug, candy and tobacco
jobbers and wholesalers. These wholesale and retail dealers were selected
partly on the basis of their willingness to resell at prices suggested by the
company and to refuse to sell to dealers who did not resell at the suggested
prices. The dealers handling Beech-Nut products comprised the greater portion
of the jobbers, wholesalers, and retailers in the grocery trades, and a large
proportion of those in the drug, candy and tobacco trades.
52. Id. at 210.
53. RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTs § 3 (1932): "An agreement is a manifestation of
mutual assent by two or more persons to one another."
54. Dunn, Resale Price Maintenance, 32 YALE L. J. 676, 692-93 (1923).
55. 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
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The control of resale prices was accomplished through the so-called "Beech-
Nut policy." The company circularized the trade generally with lists of sug-
gested wholesale and resale prices and refused to sell to jobbers, wholesalers
and retailers who sold below those prices or who sold to price cutters. It
established a card index of distributors classifying those who adhered to the
"Beech-Nut policy" as "selected dealers" and marking those who cut prices
or supplied price cutters "Do Not Sell," "D.N.S." or "Undesirable-Price
Cutter." It solicited orders from retailers directly through its own "specialty
salesmen," and refused to permit orders so obtained to be filled by wholesalers
and jobbers who cut prices or who supplied price cutters. It marked cases
of goods with key symbols by which it identified price cutters and their sup-
pliers. It refused to sell to practically all mail order houses and suppliers of
mail order houses on the ground that they frequently cut prices. It notified
specialty salesmen and suppliers when a dealer had been removed from the
selected list, and it reinstated dealers to the selected list if they gave assurance
that they would resell only at suggested prices and refuse to sell to price cutters.
The Federal Trade Commission condemned the "Beech-Nut policy" as an
unfair method of competition under section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.56 On appeal, the Second Circuit regarded the case as governed by the
Colgate decision and accordingly held that the Commission had exceeded its
power in issuing a cease and desist order.
57
The Supreme Court restored the Commission's order with what may fairly
be described as a major modification. The Court once again affirmed that
Colgate had not overruled Dr. Miles, but pointed out that unlike the case in
Dr. Miles, "the Sherman Act is not involved here except in so far as it
shows a declaration of public policy to be considered in determining what are
unfair methods of competition.. . ."58 The Court found that the "Beech-Nut
policy" went far beyond the simple refusal to deal with those who sell below
established prices, which had been permitted in Colgate: even though the
system did not utilize price maintenance contracts, it resulted in "suppression
of the freedom of competition by methods in which the cmapany secures the
co-operation of its distributors and customers, which are quite as effectual as
agreements express or implied intended to accomplish the same purpose."-59
Such cooperative devices, the Court held, were unfair methods of competition
properly subject to the Commission's cease and desist order. But the order
was too broad. It should have prohibited onl, these cooperative devices,
which the Court listed as follows: reporting the names of dealers who cut
prices, maintaining a list of blackballed dealers, employing specialty salesmen
to police the system and channel business to cooperative dealers, and marking
cases as a means of tracing price cutters.
56. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1952).
57. Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. FTC, 264 Fed. 835 (2d Cir. 1920).
58. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 453 (1922).
59. Id. at 455 (emphasis added).
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The effect of the Beech-Nut case on refusal to deal is problematical. It is
open to several possible interpretations: (1) The decision effectively over-
rules the Colgate case, and refusal to deal is no longer an available device
for effectuating resale price maintenance. (2) The decision permits a manu-
facturer to select his customers for the purpose of resale price maintenance so
long as only ineffectual means are used to carry out his selection policies.
(3) The decision condemns a method of effectuating the right of refusal to
deal that places reliance on the active assistance of dealers, but it does not
make a blanket condemnation of other methods of exercising the right to
select customers in such a way as to enforce resale maintenance.
The third interpretation seems to be the correct one. In the first place, the
Beech-Nut opinion several times, in unequivocal language, rejects the first
alternative. 0 Indeed, the suggestion that refusal to deal is in itself impermis-
sible raises a serious due process question, for the right to select customers
is a fundamental one.61 The Second Circuit recently affirmed the continuing
vitality of this right in an action by a liquor wholesaler to rescind his purchase
from an importer on the ground that the importer violated the purchase agree-
ment by selling to other wholesalers who cut prices.0 2 The court held that the
restrictive agreement was valid and its breach a valid ground for rescission,
since a "refusal to sell in the future to those who had not maintained a suggested
price" is lawful under the Colgate case.0 3 In the second place, this interpretation
of Beech-Nut is more consistent with the language in that opinion. All of the
items of conduct proscribed were "co-operative methods in which the respon-
dent and its distributors, customers and agents undertake to prevent others
from obtaining the company's products at less than the prices designated by
it .... -04 The evidence in the case amply supported the conclusion that co-
operative methods were resorted to. And presumably, the absence of the quali-
fication "co-operative" was the defect that rendered the Commission's order
too broad. Finally, it is easier to believe that the Supreme Court would have
overruled Colgate directly if it wished to reach that result.
The Court's condemnation of Beech-Nut's use of "co-operative" methods
to police its resale price policy seems to rest on two related considerations.
The first of these is the coercive effect of the system on the retail dealer: the
Court emphasized that the system "constrains the trader, if he would have
the products of the Beech-Nut Company, to maintain the prices 'suggested'
by it." 5 This same judicial reaction to dealer coercion has found expression
in more recent decisions. 6 The second consideration underlying the con-
60. Id. at 452-53, 454.
61. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 306-07 (1919) ; Dunn, Resale
Price Maintenance, 32 YAL, L. J. 676, 705 (1923).
62. Adams-Mitchell Co. v. Cambridge Distributing Co., 189 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1951).
63. Id. at 916.
64. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co. 257 U.S. 441, 455 (1922) (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 454.
66. See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. 340 U.S. 211,
213-14 (1951), where the Court, in speaking of an agreement between affiliated companies
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demnation of cooperative methods would seem to be their widespread economic
impact: the Court found that the Beech-Nut policy necessarily "restrains the
natural flow of commerce and the freedom of competition in the channels of
interstate trade which it has been the purpose of all the Antitrust Acts to
maintain."
67
Although at first blush the Beech-Nut case appears to preserve the legality
of all "noncooperative" systems of refusal to deal, the Court's consideration
of the economic impact of the "Beech-Nut policy" and the development of
market power, rather than legal form, as the standard of legality in recent
antitrust cases,' 8 indicate that a further limitation has been placed on the
Colgate doctrine. The form that resale price maintenance takes may not be con-
trolling if the economic effect of the price maintenance system is in derogation
of the policy of the Sherman Act. Setting resale prices is an insignificant
restraint on trade so long as the producer is subject to competitive pressures
to keep his price low. But if competitive pressure is lacking, so that the manu-
facturer can set arbitrary prices and thereby impose a significant restraint
of trade, his ability to effectuate resale price maintenance by a refusal to deal
or any other device is undesirable.69
to fix maximum resale prices for their products, stated: "For such agreements, no less
than those to fix minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain
their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment." This statement is weakened by
the Court's subsequent suggestion that "Seagram and Calvert acting individually perhaps
might have refused to deal with petitioner or with any or all of the Indiana %,holesalers."
Id. at 214. Again in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 334 (1951),
the Court stated:
"Elimination of price competition at the retail level may, of course, lawfully result
if a distributor successfully negotiates individual 'vertical' agreements with all
his retailers. But when retailers are forced to abandon price competition, they are
driven into a compact in violation of the spirit of the proviso which forbids 'hori-
zontal' price fixing. ... Contracts or agreements convey the idea of a cooperative
arrangement, not a program whereby recalcitrants are dragged in by the heels
and compelled to submit to price fixing."
Id. at 389-90.
67. FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441, 454 (1922).
63. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (division of
world markets); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215
(1951) (maximum price fixing agreement) ; United States v. General Motors Corp., 121
F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941) (tying arrangement).
69. A manufacturer operating in a noncompetitive market is in a position to whip
his retailers into line if the elasticity of demand for his product is slight-as it is apt to be
when the manufacturer's market position is substantial and relatively free from price
pressure. The dealer who refuses to sell at the manufacturer's price and is denied the
manufacturer's products will find his customers leaving him to purchase those products--
and inevitably substantial quantities of other goods-from more compliant retailers. As a
matter of economic policy, therefore, the refusal to deal, like fair trade, shuuld Le
available only in a-market characterized by free and open competition. Similarly, resale
price maintenance by refusal to deal or by any other device should be questioned in
industries with a high degree of price parallelism, where identical resale price arrange-
ments are used by competitors to achieve price leadership or to reap the benefits of the forbid-
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Thus, the refusal to deal remains an abstract, general right-exempt from
express antitrust prohibition, but carefully circumscribed by the courts. They
have distinguished between individual and concerted action to implement the
right.7° They have frowned on joint or conspiratorial refusals to deal when
used as coercive weapons against outsiders. 71 They have condemned such con-
spiratorial action as an unreasonable restraint of trade under section 1 of
the Sherman Act,72 and as an unfair method of competition tinder section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.73 They have barred a unilateral refusal
to deal where used as part of an attempt to monopolize within the meaning
of section 2 of the Sherman Act.7 4 Nonetheless, the refusal to deal remains
factually equivocal and legally neutral, relying for its validity on the business
context in which it is used. Standing alone, the naked refusal to deal is neither
intrinsically suspect nor wholly immune from antitrust controls. Where
carried out through noncooperative methods by a company that is subject to
effective price competition, in furtherance of non-conspiratorial, non-monopo-
listic ends, it remains a lawful method for achieving, preserving and extending
business advantage.
den horizontal price fixing agreement: "Because a single price fixed commodity is subject
to the inroads of competitors fixing lower prices, a manufacturer seldom will establish and
enforce a system of vertical prices unless he knows that competing manufacturers are
likewise fixing and enforcing prices at known levels. Although competing manufacturers
cannot lawfully agree with each other respecting prices, they can accomplish the same
result through resale price maintenance by making identical resale agreements." FTC,
REPORT ON RESALE PlICE MAINTENANCE lxii (1945). See American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S,
208 (1939) ; Note, Use of Resale Price Maintenance By Integrated Manufacturers: A
New Loophole for Abuse of Monopoly Power, 64 YALE L.J. 426, 431-32 (1954.)
70. See Montague v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38, 45 (1904).
71. Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 597-98 (1936) ; United States v.
American Livestock Comm'n Co., 279 U.S. 435, 438 (1929) ; Cement Manufacturers' Pro-
tective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 604 (1925). In these earlier cases, the Supreme
Court indicated it would allow some latitude to group-organized refusals to deal, when
used as a means of curbing abusive or fraudulent business conduct.
72. United States v. Frankfort Distillers, Inc., 324 U.S. 293 (1945); United States
v. First Nat'l Pictures, Inc., 282 U.S. 44 (1930); Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930) ; cf. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). See
also, dicta in Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 625 (1953) ;
United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948). A program of collabora-
tion and mutual aid in enforcing resale price maintenance may involve enough conspira-
torial elements to result in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. See United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707, 723 (1944) ; Connecticut Importing Co. v. Con-
tinental Distilling Corp., 129 F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 1942).
73. See, e.g., FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); Shakespeare
Co. v. FTC, 50 F.2d 758 (6th Cir. 1931); J. W. Kobi Co. v. FTC, 23 F.2d 41 (2d Cir.
1927); Moir v. FTC, 12 F.2d 22 (1st Cir. 1926); Q.R.S. Music Co. v. FTC, 12 F.2d 730
(7th Cir. 1926); Hills Bros. v. FTC, 9 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1926). See also FTC v.
Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 395 (1953); Fashion Originators'
Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).




WVe come now to the third device by which the manufacturer might, in the
absence of fair trade legislation, effectuate resale price maintenance: the agency
plan or the del credere agency system.75 Although the agreements in the Dr.
Miles case were labeled "Consignment Contract-Wholesale" and "Retail
Agency Contract," the Court decided that no genuine agency existed.7 6
Accordingly, its holding that the restrictive agreements before it were un-
lawful restraints of trade both at common law and under the Sherman Act
left undetermined the permissibility of maintaining resale prices by retailing
goods through sale agencies.
The question left open in Dr. Miles was settled temporarily by United
States v. General Electric Co. 77 There the Government challenged General
Electric's system of distributing lamps as "merely a device to enable the
Electric Company to fix the resale price of lamps in the hands of purchasers,"7 8
and consequently as illegal under the Sherman Act. The company's defense
was that its distributors were bona fide agents who never had title to the lamps,
that no restraints on resale price were imposed on purchasers from these
agents, and that the company was merely asserting its right to sell goods owned
by it at the prices it chose.
79
General Electric sold its lamps either directly to customers or else through
dealers whom it described as agents: large dealers, so-called "B agents," of
whom there were about 400; and about 21,000 local electrical retailers, whom
it called "A agents." These agents entered into contracts with GE, elaborately
regulating the manner of handling, selling and paying for GE lamps. The
lamps were sent to the agents on consignment, and remained the property of
the company, subject to return upon demand. Sales could be made only to
designated classes of ultimate consumers and only at prices established by the
company. Proceeds from sales were held in trust for the company, for a
monthly accounting, the agents being compensated by fixed commissions upon
the lamps sold. Expenses of storage, sale and distribution were borne by the
agents, as were losses from uncollectible accounts. GE paid insurance and
taxes on the lamps, and the freight on its consignments to the agents, and
assumed the risk of fire, flood, obsolescence and price decline.
The Court noted that General Electric's distribution plan was devised to
allow the company to deal directly with its consumers, avoiding the possibility of
price competition among middlemen. But it found that the distributors were
genuine agents of the company, and asserted that "there is nothing as a matter of
principle or in the authorities which requires us to hold that genuine contracts
75. "Not infrequently, in consideration of an increased commission, the factir guar-
antees the payment of debts arising through his agency, in which case he is said to
sell upon a d credere commission." 1 MEcE,,, AGENCY § 74 (2d ed. 1914).
76. 220 U.S. 373, 476 (1911).
77. 272 U.S. 476 (1926).
78. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 479 (1926).
79. Id. at 479.
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of agency like those before us, however comprehensive as a mass or whole
in their effect, are violations of the Anti-Trust Act."80 In 1949, in another
antitrust proceeding, a federal district court upheld the same agency arrange-
ments even though GE's patents had since expired.81 This decision points up
the fact that the earlier General Electric case rested not on the special antitrust
exemption afforded to patents but solely on the legality of the agency relation-
ship between manufacturer and distributor.
The decision in the General Electric case is significant in two respects: it
affirms the legality of resale price maintenance by means of a distributor-
agency system, even when the agents are otherwise independent dealers; and
it indicates how closely a permissible agency system may resemble distribution
through outright sales to independent wholesalers and retailers. With regard
to the legality of the agency system, it should be noted that the General
Electric decision also affirmed the right of a patentee, as a normal incident of
his patent privilege, to fix the prices at which his licensee will sell goods
manufactured under the patent.8 2 Since a manufacturer has as legitimate
a proprietary interest in his own goods as a patentee has over the subject
matter of the patent, there is no good reason on principle why the manufacturer
of the goods should not be able, like the patentee, to control the price at which
his property is sold. Indeed, where an agency system is employed no property
interest in the goods passes to the agent; whereas a patent licensee may have
title to the goods manufactured by him under the license. It is reasonable
enough that a producer should have the right to market his own products on
any terms he deems fit, so long as he is subject to effective competitive pressure
and his pricing decisions are made unilaterally. The General Electric decision
simply sanctions a practicable method of giving effect to this right.
General Electric does not delimit the sales arrangements that the Court is
willing to recognize as falling within the category of bona fide "agency," 8 0
but it does suggest that the term is broadly inclusive. It should, for instance,
include an ordinary consignment sale. The GE arrangement verged on out-
right dealer ownership of the manufacturer's products, for although GE re-
tained technical title to the lamps, the dealers were allotted many of the inci-
dents of ownership. Thus they bore the risk of loss on delinquent accounts-
a standard feature of the so-called del credere agency 84-and on lamps lost,
missing or damaged while in their custody. The agents also bore the expenses
of storage, transportation, distribution and sale: again indicia of purchase
rather than bailment.
It remains to consider the impact of United States v. Masonite Corp.8 5 on
the General Electric doctrine. In this case the Government sought an injunc-
80. Id. at 488.
81. United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753, 824-26 (D.N.J. 1949), final
judgment, 115 F. Supp. 835 (D.N.J. 1953).
82. United States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 490 (1926).
83. See Note, 27 CoLuALn. . REv. 567 (1927).
84. See note 75 supra.
85. 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
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tion under the Sherman Act, alleging a combination in restraint of trade.
Masonite was a manufacturer and distributor of hardboard. Partly by threats
of patent infringement suits, it persuaded other manufacturers and distributors
who had been marketing hardboard under competing patents, to enter into
so-called del credere agency relationships with Masonite. Masonite designated
each of these competitors its "agent" and "del credere factor" to sell its
products. The agents acknowledged the validity of Mlasonite's patents, and
agreed to sell and promote its products through their own sales organizations.
Masonite set the selling prices and the terms of sale, and both Masonite and
the "agents" bound themselves to observe them. The Court observed that in
the absence of Masonite's patents and the del credere agency agreements,
the arrangement would amount to a price fixing combination and hence a per
se violation of the Sherman Act.80 It conceded that the agreements made the
distributors del credere agents of Masonite, and that "there is a proper area
for utilization by a patentee of a del credere agent in the sale or disposition of
the patented article"--where "distribution is part of the patentee's own busi-
ness."87 But Masonite's distributors were also competitors, and the Court
held that where a patentee
"utilizes the sales organization of another business-a business with which
he has no intimate relationship--quite different problems are posed since
such a regimentation of a marketing system is peculiarly susceptible to
the restraints of trade which the Sherman Act condemns. And when it
is clear, as it is in this case, that the marketing systems utilized by means
of the del credere agency agreements are those of competitors of the
patentee, and that the purpose is to fix prices at which the competitors
may market the product, the device is, without more, an enlargement of
the limited patent privilege and a violation of the Sherman Act." 5
The Court distinguished General Electric on the ground that GE's purpose
had been only to secure a patentee's proper reward for his invention, while
Masonite sought to destroy competition among competing patentees.8 3
The Masonite case imposes no fatal restriction on the use of the agency
device as approved in General Electric. The Court not only distinguished
General Electric but expressly recognized the legality of the agency device
in appropriate situations.90 Sales agencies might well be, in some situations,
the only practicable way for a manufacturer to give effect to his right to market
his product on his own terms. This right wras accorded recognition by Colgate
and it survived Beech-Nut; and there is no reason to believe that the Court
in Masonite intended to extinguish it.9 1
86. Id. at 274.
87. Id. at 279.
88. Ibid.
89. Id. at 280-81.
90. Id. at 279.
91. It might be asked whether, as a matter of economic policy, the nmnufacturer should
be able to impose price restrictions on otherwise independent dealers through the use of the
traditional rules of agency. It may be that the independent merchant should be left free
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The Masonite opinion emphasizes that the evil of the agency device, as it
operated in that case, was the elimination of price competition and competition
in innovation among competing producers-a factor totally absent in Gcncral
Electric. Professor Chafee has suggested that the whole process of marketing
goods, from producer through distributor to ultimate consumer, is a unified oper-
ation, in the control of which the manufacturer might well have a legitimate inter-
est.92 General Electric's economic control of its goods was of this vertical variety
and was implicitly approved by the Court. But such control is a far cry from
the horizontal pricing agreement between competing producers that was struck
down in Masonite and other cases. Such horizontal control inevitably restricts
competition and in so doing contravenes the policy of the Sherman Act.
to exercise his own judgment in pricing his wares-such freedom being the essence of
retail competition. This reasoning suggests what might be termed a "capital-dependency"
test, for determining whether a contract purporting to make an independent retailer into
a manufacturer's sales agent should be recognized as a legitimate agency. If the independent
distributor bears the financial risk of mistaken judgment in his retailing activities, a wise
competitive policy would by this logic permit him to reap the rewards of a sound exercise
of judgment, including his decisions relative to pricing policies. On the other hand, if the
distributor is heavily dependent financially on the manufacturer, so that a substantial
portion of the financial risk of bad judgment is borne by the latter, the manufacturer, under
the capital-dependency test, would be allowed to impose his judgment, in regard to resale
pricing policies, on the distributor.
From an economic point of view, however, it seems more important to determine the
extent of competition on the manufacturing level than to inquire into the capital dependency
of the distributor-agents. As long as the manufacturer operates in an atmosphere of "free
and open competition," there is little danger of arbitrary pricing or significant dealer
coercion. Moreover, in effectively competitive markets the desirability of affording tile
manufacturer protection for his good will, and the independent retailer a safeguard against
loss-leader selling should counter-balance whatever element of coercion is involved in the
agency relationship.
92. Chafee, Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARv. L. REV. 945, at 946-47 (1928):
"The same development in standardized products which has led to equitable protec-
tion against unauthorized imitations of trade names or the physical appearance of
articles has also made it desirable to producers that these standardized goods should
pass to the ultimate consumers through well regulated channels, and oftentimes that
they should be used by the consumers in such a manner as to aid in the maintenance
of a complex marketing system... . Each ambitious seller by expensive advertising
and a vast network of dealers creates in the public the habit of expecting a well
remembered product of supposedly high uniform quality in a uniform guise at a
uniform price for a uniform quantity. Irregular and unauthorized departures front
uniformity in any respect tear this pattern of thought and emotion which has been
woven with so much trouble and cost, and tend to reduce the minds of the public to
the confusion which preceded the marketing campaign. The same irrational causes
which lead a consumer to select a given article may as easily divert him away from
it to a competitor. ... [The manufacturer wants] to make the intermediary trans-
fers of title legally immaterial to the extent that they are in fact immaterial to his
scheme, and to be able to treat the entire process of marketing his goods front
the factory to the consumer as a unified transaction, in which successive sales are
merely incidental breaks serving only a limited purpose which does not affect the
reputation of his goods."
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There is no reason why agency arrangements lacking such restrictive economic
effects should not be permitted.
Thus it is that the agency distribution system remains an alternative device
for effectuating resale price maintenance. The broad utilization of this device
in General Electric survives Masonite, with the limitation that the system be
vertical only and not eliminate horizontal competition. A likely further limita-
tion is that the manufacturer establishing an agency system be subject to
effective price competition, for a producer with substantial market power could,
by virtue of his ability to establish arbitrary resale prices, cause a restraint
of trade.
CONCLUSION
Masonite dearly demonstrates the willingness of the Court to disregard
legal form in condemning restraints of trade that constitute significant devia-
tions from Sherman Act policy:
"So far as the Sherman Act is concerned, the result must turn not on
the skill with which counsel has manipulated the concepts of 'sale' and
'agency' but on the significance of the business practices in terms of re-
straint of trade."9
3
Nor is this subordination of legal form to economic effect confined to an
agency context. In the light of recent decisions any resale price maintenance
device might be condemned where it is used to achieve the regimentation of
competing marketing systems, where it is used to achieve uniformity of price
among competing producers, or where the manufacturer is not subject to
significant competitive pressure on his pricing policies. As a consequence, a
producer with dominant or even substantial market power might be unable,
absent fair trade, to maintain resale prices by any means.
On the other hand, unless repeal of the Miller-Tydings and McGuire Acts
is taken by the courts to mean congressional condemnation of all forms of
resale price maintenance-an unlikely prospect-the refusal to deal and the
agency system, and possibly the equitable servitudes doctrine, would remain
alternative devices for resale price maintenance. In that eventuality the demise
of the fair trade laws with their "free and open competition" proviso would
result in a net loss to price competition. Although the judicial emphasis on
economic effect may be enough to prevent a producer with substantial market
power from employing the alternative devices, no decision has expressly set
out the requirement that a manufacturer establishing resale prices via a uni-
lateral refusal to deal or an agency system be subject to effective price compe-
tition. Beech-Nut might be construed to prohibit only the manufacturer's
solicitation of active assistance by his dealers in policing a price maintenance
system; and Masonite might be restricted to situations where there is a patent
monopoly or a horizontal price agreement 4 Consequently, it is possible that
93. United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 2,80 (1942).
94. See United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 333, 339 (S.D.N.Y.
1954), criticized in Note, 64 Y.ALE L.J. 426 (1954).
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the alternative devices are available even to a producer with substantial market
power. But fair trade, with effective enforcement of the "free and open compe-
tition" proviso, would not be available to such a producer. And it is likely
that the existence of "free and open competition" as an explicit condition of
fair trade would serve as helpful precedent for limiting the alternative devices
to situations where the producer is subject to effective price competition.
At any rate, if more price competition is the goal, it appears wiser to insist
on vigorous enforcement of the statutory requirement that price fixed com-
modities be in "free and open competition with goods of the same general
class produced or distributed by others"95 rather than to advocate outright
repeal of the fair trade laws. It seems wiser-and politically more realistic-
to demand extension of the "free and open competition" proviso to other
forms of resale price maintenance rather than to urge the repeal of the only
laws of which it is now an explicit part.
95. McGuire Act, 66 STAT. 632, 15 U.S.C. § 45(5) (a) (2) (1952) ; Miller-Tydings
Act, 50 STAT. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952). The history of the enforcenient of
these provisos has been discouraging. See note 6 supra.
